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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA A/S THOMAS SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EFIN EAID ECON SOCI HO
SUBJECT: CAN PRESIDENT ZELAYA BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE FOLD? 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 849 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000863  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (B & D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Zelaya is a contrarian with a chip on his 
shoulder who has nonetheless made it to the pinnacle of 
Honduran politics.  We think his move to the left was in part 
prompted by his group of leftist advisors, his declining 
popularity, increasingly shrill personal attacks on him by 
the conservative media, the lure of easy Venezuelan money and 
his own feeling of being an outsider.  Through his own 
follies and missteps, he alienated his party, the media, the 
national business elite and even his once loyal public, and 
is now almost completely isolated.  He appears to have been 
unable to secure his future post-election by getting allies 
onto the election slates or other positions of power (Supreme 
Court and Attorney General's office), which has made him so 
desperate as to turn to Hugo Chavez.  We believe that if 
handled correctly, the United States can maintain 
constructive ties with Zelaya, although we expect him to 
continue to seek to expand relations with Chavez.  (Note: 
The negative reaction from us and his public to his slap at 
the United States by delaying acceptance of our new 
Ambassador's credentials may have given him pause.  End 
Note.)  We believe the most critical period stretches from 
now until the November primaries, as once two viable 
democratic candidates are selected, Zelaya's power will 
diminish dramatically.  The period following the primaries 
and until a new U.S. administration comes on board will be a 
time of uncertainty, and we could ease Zelaya's fears and 
show the USG is interested in Honduras by showing public 
support, especially with high-level USG visitors.  With only 
16 months left before Zelaya leaves office, our goal should 
be to ensure that he successfully completes his term, and 
that we maintain good cooperation on issues of core national 
security.  To achieve this we will need a proactive 
diplomatic strategy centered on a positive agenda that makes 
the case to Zelaya, the political and business classes and 
the Honduran people, that their balance sheet is best served 
by working with the Untied States and cooperating to advance 
common objectives.  A key part of our approach is to work 
with Honduras and the international community to ensure that 
viable (free and fair) primaries and elections are held and 
that the constitutional process of succession beyond Zelaya 
continues unimpaired.  End Summary. 
 
(C) Cowboy, Outsider, Rebel 
------------------ 
¶2. (C) Manuel "Mel" Zelaya's closest advisors repeatedly tell 
us that he is passionate, volatile and unpredictable.   He is 
a product of his upbringing in the "wild, wild west" of 
Hondurans, and reflects it in everything he does, from his 
dress to his speech.  He did not grow up in a big city, and 
he did not go to the American School of Tegucigalpa, where 
future Honduran leaders are traditionally formed, or any 
other elite international school in Honduras, so he has 
always felt like an outsider from the power classes.  His 
family has money, but it was earned by working the land, not 
the political system.  Zelaya is often ridiculed for his lack 
of a university degree (he only took a handful of classes) 
and lack of English-language skills, and close advisors tell 
us that he has a "chip on his shoulder" and that these 
criticisms hurt him deeply. Because of this, Zelaya fashions 
himself a rebel -- driving a Harley-Davidson motorcycle and 
lashing out under pressure. 
 
¶3. (C) Despite being an outsider, Zelaya is an adept 
political animal and has achieved the greatest of Honduran 
political goals -- becoming President of the Republic.  He 
achieved this by working his way up through the party ranks 
through years of filling all the important party positions. 
He is also extremely popular with the poor because he looks 
like them (wears boots and cowboy hats) and talks like them 
in simple Spanish.  Post-election, Zelaya had incredibly high 
polling numbers that hovered in the 80 percentile. 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000863  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Zelaya's Move to the Left 
------------------------ 
¶4. (C) It was only once safely ensconced in the office of the 
President that we begin to see Zelaya move towards the left. 
We believe he did this for two reasons:  1) he surrounded 
himself with a group of advisors who are traditional 
European-style socialists, including Liberal Party President 
Patricia Rodas who has strong ties to Nicaraguan Sandinistas, 
who pushed him in that directions (these advisors have been 
dubbed "patricios" by the press); and 2) he began to use 
populist rhetoric to attack traditional elites to garner 
support among the majority of the population.  (Comment: 
While his attacks on the elites have a populist tint, much of 
what he says on how the traditional power elite have abused 
the resources of this country for their own personal gain 
tracks with our and other outsiders' analysis.  End Comment.) 
 
 
Clashes with the Public 
------------------- 
¶5. (C) As Zelaya and his "patricios" began the difficult job 
of governing, they proposed programs that made little 
economic sense.  In addition, Zelaya did almost nothing to 
build support for these programs before announcing them, 
usually catching the rest of the country by surprise.  In one 
instance, Zelaya attempted to create a state monopoly for 
fuel imports and take over fuel storage tanks.  He heavily 
subsidized motor fuels, at considerable budgetary cost, and 
capped electricity rates in the face of sharply rising fuel 
prices.  When these policies became unsustainable 
financially, he then proposed to ration fuel by requiring car 
owners to choose one day a week when they would not drive 
("Hoy no Circula"), but did not consider that Hondurans do 
not have any safe and reliable public transportation options. 
 Time and again, Zelaya clashed with the general public by 
not taking the time to vet his ideas or consider the 
consequences. 
 
Clashes with the Political and Business Class 
----------------- 
¶6. (C) Zelaya also had multiple public clashes with other 
powerful public figures, including from his own party. 
Zelaya fought with President of the Congress Roberto 
Micheletti (Liberal Party) over multiple issues, including a 
prosecutors' strike and electoral reform, and although 
Micheletti came out bruised, most experts agree that Zelaya 
lost every battle.  Zelaya clashed with the Congress on many 
other issues, and often simply pocket vetoed their bills. 
This is a presidential tradition in Honduras, but it 
infuriated the Congress nonetheless.  He fought with Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Vilma Morales (National Party) over "Hoy 
no Circula" and Micheletti's candidacy, losing both of those 
battles.  Zelaya also clashed with the Attorney General over 
the search of former Hondutel Director Marcelo Chimirri's 
offices and residence and the subsequent arrest warrant, 
despite the fact that the search had been ordered based on a 
complaint filed by Zelaya himself. And finally, he had myriad 
private clashes with the elite businesspeople of the country, 
and usually ended them by having their business permits 
pulled and/or their tax returns audited. 
 
Zelaya Isolated 
------------- 
¶7. (C) As Zelaya's clashes with the public, the political 
class, and the business class increased, his popularity 
plummeted.  He appeared to have backed himself into a corner 
without allies, and had few prospects for the future.  To 
continue to influence politics after his term, Zelaya knew he 
would have to place allies into positions of influence, but 
despite attempts at negotiations, none of the three Liberal 
candidates vying to replace him agreed to take on any of the 
"patricios" on their slates as congressional candidates, and 
only a handful of Zelaya loyalists have made it onto any 
slate in any capacity. 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000863  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Nowhere to Turn 
-------------- 
¶8. (C) Frustrated and isolated, Zelaya looked for something 
dramatic to drum up support and/or bring in new funds to buy 
new allies.  Zelaya had flirted with Hugo Chavez before and 
received a few shipments of subsidized fuel through 
Petrocaribe.  Since the Petrocaribe deal, with its promises 
of new funds from the sale of subsidized oil, passed 
Congress, Zelaya probably decided that the public and the 
Congress would agree to another deal with Chavez -- ALBA -- 
if it meant major funding flowing into Honduras.  And when 
Chavez called Zelaya out during a rally in Nicaragua on July 
19, pushing him to make a decision on ALBA, Zelaya appeared 
to believe he had no other options.  What followed the August 
25 signing ceremony was an almost universal public and media 
rejection of Chavez and ALBA, something that Zelaya was 
probably not expecting, but something that increased his 
feelings of isolation. 
 
The Credentialing Ceremony 
------------------------ 
¶9. (C) Zelaya's decision to cancel the Ambassador's 
credentialing ceremony was probably made at the last moment 
in the middle of the night (see reftel).  The negative public 
reaction (and our private warnings of consequences) were 
probably far stronger than he had imagined.  He has now taken 
a step backwards and has worked to repair relations, first by 
quickly changing his rhetoric and praising U.S. assistance, 
by calling the event a postponement instead of a 
cancellation, and by rescheduling; by reaching out to the 
Embassy through a number of channels, including to the new 
Ambassador on two occasions, to reassure us of his desire to 
have good relations; and in general by making several public 
announcements on the importance of good relations with the 
United States. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶10. (C) With only 16 months before he leaves office, our goal 
is to get Zelaya through his term without causing any 
irreparable damage to bilateral relations or to Honduras, 
future development possibilities, and to minimize further 
expansion of relations with Chavez.  Successful elections 
that lead to a successor will play a key role.  We intend to 
work with the other donor nations and international 
organizations to support this end.  Party primary elections 
will be held in November and will produce two clear potential 
successors.  The period from now until these primaries are 
held will be key.  Public attention will turn to the 
victorious candidates and Zelaya will become less and less 
influential. 
 
¶11. (C) Public criticism of Zelaya will only make him feel 
more isolated.  We recommend keeping our criticism private 
and supporting him, when plausible, in public.  We need to 
reduce his level of fear and suspicion toward us.  We believe 
that a proactive agenda including the scheduling of USG 
high-level visitors, such as WHA A/S Thomas Shannon and 
others, including Congressional leaders, particularly over 
the next couple of months before the coming U.S. transition 
would be very helpful in conveying our support for Honduran 
democracy and the electoral process, easing friction with 
Zelaya and boosting his sense of personal security, and 
sending the message that the United States is focused on what 
is happening in Honduras.  The "patricios" would probably be 
only too happy to hope that the United States retaliate and 
disengage, which opens the door more widely for Chavez and 
the Cubans.  We will also encourage Zelaya and his 
supporters, as well as other key political and business 
players, to lessen tensions.  For Zelaya's opponents, an 
effort to bring him back to the fold may be the best way to 
get him away from Chavez's deadly embrace. End Comment. 
LLORENS